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MINSTRELS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN?:
BRITISH COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION, AND THE
ARGUMENT FOR AN EXTENSION OF
PERFORMERS' RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
I. INTRODUCTION
Ian Anderson has been a professional musician for the past forty
years.' As the leader of the British rock group, Jethro Tull, Anderson has
composed approximately 300 songs, 3 released over thirty albums,4 sold
over sixty million records worldwide5 and-apart from a brief hiatus in the
early part of the 1980s-toured the world continuously since 1969.6 At the
height of their popularity, roughly 1971 through 1980, Jethro Tull enjoyed
rock superstar status arguably on a par with Led Zeppelin and the Rolling
Stones. During this period, the group would routinely perform at venues
such as Madison Square Garden and the Los Angeles Forum for
engagements of up to five nights per tour.7 Although Jethro Tull has since
come down from the dizzying heights of arena-rock superstardom, the
group, under Ian Anderson's leadership, continues to record, and to
perform before sold-out audiences worldwide.
Because of his lifelong status in the pantheon of rock & roll icons
(together with formidable entrepreneurial skills in the realm of commercial
aquaculture), Anderson does not personally need to worry about earning a
living-his ownership in the copyrights to the music of Jethro Tull alone
would guarantee that. Nevertheless, Ian Anderson stands as a
spokesperson (one of a number of such public figures) at the vanguard of a
1. The title for this Comment was inspired by the title of the 1975 album, The Minstrel in
the Gallery, by the British rock group, Jethro Tull.
2. Ian Anderson, Anderson Speaks Out on Recorded Copyright Law in the UK, (Apr. 1,
2006), http://www.jtull.com/news/ukcopyrightlaw.cfm.
3. E-mail from Anne Leighton, North American Publicist for Jethro Tull, to the author (Mar.
26, 2007, 12:07 PM EST) (on file with author).
4. Anderson, supra note 2.
5. E-mail from Anne Leighton, North American Publicist for Jethro Tull, to the author (Jan.
19, 2007, 10:24 PM EST) (on file with author).
6. See The Ministry of Information of Tull Tour History,
http://www.ministry-of-information.co.U.K.uk/setlist/82b.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
7. See id.
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movement among recording artists and music industry representatives in
Great Britain. These artists and executives wish to forestall the impending
expiration of copyright protection for an enormous body of nationally-
originated musical recordings under current British law.
The protection at issue is that which covers performers-for the
purposes of this discussion the people who played on the recordings from
the early years of rock & roll (as distinct from the composers of the music
contained in those recordings), and the companies that manufacture and
distribute those recordings. The recordings that are of greatest relevance to
this issue are those that were produced throughout the formative years of
rock & roll. These years laid the foundation for an industry that, for all its
well-publicized tribulations of the past decade, is still a driving force in
world culture and in the economics of the entertainment industry.
Ian Anderson's written thoughts on this subject formed the impetus
for this Comment. 8 Subsequent to reading Anderson's thoughts on the
subject, the author engaged Anderson in a lengthy one-on-one discussion of
the issues at stake, via telephone.9 That conversation, together with the
written comments posted by Anderson on Jethro Tull's website, also
provided the initial viewpoint that informs the body of this Comment.
Following the introductory comments of Part I, this Comment opens,
in Part II, with a description of the basic issue-the impending expiration
of performers' rights protection for music recorded in Great Britain in the
1950s and 1960s. Part III compares the doctrines that govern performers'
rights and their development in the U.S., and in Great Britain and the
European Union. This section of the Comment includes a step-by-step
analysis of the events (governed by developments in British statutory law,
and under various international treaties) that have led Great Britain and the
European Union to the place where they now stand, relative to performers'
rights. Next, in Part IV, the focus of the discussion is narrowed to an
examination of the debate currently underway in Great Britain, concerning
the imminent expiration of protection for a generation's worth of recorded
music. Part V presents an analysis of the legal and philosophical
underpinnings of copyright and performers' rights protections. Using
analogues from the American experience in developing protections for
performers, this Comment provides an examination of arguments both in
favor of and opposed to an extension to the term of such protection, as it
now stands in the U.K. and in the E.U. These arguments will be assessed
8. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 2.
9. Telephone Interview with Ian Anderson, Singer/Songwriter for the rock group, Jethro
Tull (Aug. 14, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Anderson Interview].
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in light of the current situation emerging in the U.K. The Comment will
conclude by advocating an extension to performers' rights protections,
under E.U. and U.K. law.
II. THE BASIC ISSUE
In America, sound recordings are a category of work protected under
copyright law.10 In Europe, specific protection of rights is extended to
performers in sound recordings (as distinct from the rights to the
compositions contained in sound recordings). 1 These rights are known as
performers' rights, which is a sub-species of what are known as
neighboring rights.12 Under federal law in the United States, there had
historically been no protection of such rights until, in 1971, Congress
amended the Copyright Act of 1909 to provide protection for this category
of works, and subsequently incorporated the substance of that amendment
into the Copyright Act of 1976.'
In Great Britain, performers' rights currently extend fifty years from
the date of the release of a recorded piece of music.' 4 The ramifications of
this fifty-year limit on protection are that the recordings of the early years
of rock & roll are due to begin falling out of protection, and into the public
domain, over the coming years.15 The recordings that represent the musical
heritage of Great Britain thus will inexorably and continually become part
of the public domain. For example, the Beatles' catalogue and the early
Rolling Stones' catalogue will both become fair game for unlicensed copies
16of those recordings to be produced and sold in Europe. To be more
specific, in terms of providing an example of the effects of the expiration of
protection, "Cliff[] [Richards's] earliest tracks would start to come out of
copyright in 2008" and "[t]he Beatles would ... be in a similar situation
from 2012, the 50th anniversary of their first hit single, Love Me Do."'
17
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2006); see generally MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT LAW (4th ed. 2005) (providing an historical overview of intellectual property
protections).
11. RICHARD ARNOLD, PERFORMERS' RIGHTS 3-5 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the rise of
performers' rights as separate and apart from those of authors').
12. Id. at 11, 13.
13. CRAIG JOYCE, ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 166, 196-97 (7th ed. 2006); see 17 U.S.C.
§ 114; see also LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 366-67.
14. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, Part II, § 191 (1988).
15. See Isabel Davies & Lorna Sprostan, Term of Protection Directive, 27 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. n.85 (Apr., 2005).
16. See Anderson Interview, supra note 9; see also Davies & Sprostan, supra note 15, at 85
(discussing sound recordings made before 1954).
17. Musical Copyright Terms 'To Stay', BBC NEWS, Nov. 27, 2006,
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This fundamental alteration in the status of recorded music will mean
the loss of revenues to record companies, and to performers who own the
rights to these recordings.' 8 In addition to the damage that this loss of
revenue will do to the performers of yesteryear, there is the potential for
damage to the performers of tomorrow, since the recording industry will
lose revenue that might otherwise be put into the development of emerging
talent. 19
Recently, in Great Britain, there has been a call for a change in the
basic scheme of performers' rights protections.20 With increasing vigor,
performers and representatives of the recording industry have been calling
upon the British government to do something about the impending
expiration of protection for performers' rights.2 ' Unfortunately, the issue
does not simply implicate the British government. Were it limited to just
the U.K., this issue might be relatively easy to resolve. However, any
alteration to neighboring rights protections must be pan-European in
nature, because the limits of such protection are not a matter of a single
country's laws but are governed by the provisions of what is known as the
"Term Directive" contained in European Union law.2 2 The Term Directive
serves to harmonize the laws of the countries that comprise the E.U., and
mandates a fifty-year term of protection for performances in sound
recordings2 3
Once the European Union is added to the equation, the issue of
providing an extension to performers' rights protections becomes complex.
For one thing, the progression of recorded music into the public domain
does not particularly harm the countries of continental Europe. On the
contrary, such status-for what have previously been protected works-
would represent an economic boon to consumers in those nations. The
result would be that recorded music would become more cheaply available
in unlicensed form since it would be produced independently of the original
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/6186436.stm [hereinafter Musical Copyright].
18. Anderson Interview, supra note 9; Musical Copyright, supra note 17.
19. Anderson Interview, supra note 9.
20. See Davies & Sprostan, supra note 15, at n.85.
21. See id.; see also Anderson Interview, supra note 9; Louise Jury, Singers Face Losing
Copyright Battle, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 28, 2006, available at
http://enjoyment.independent.co.uk/music/news/article202 1237.ece (stating that "Sir Cliff
Richard, Mick Hucknall, Katie Melua and Ian Anderson, of Jethro Tull, are among many of the
singers to have called for an extension of the limit that expires after 50 years-compared with the
95 years enjoyed by performers in the United States").
22. Council Directive 93/98, art. 3.1, 1993 O.J. (L290) 9 (EEC).
23. Id.; see also ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 37 (discussing the operation of the Term
Directive).
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record company, which had distributed the work and with whom the
performers had maintained contractual relationships.
24
Additionally, there is not the same incentive in Europe to champion
this issue as there is in Great Britain because, although any country
undoubtedly has its top performers of popular music within a limited
geographic region, the countries of continental Europe do not boast the
enormous talent-pool that Great Britain represents.25 There are no French
Rolling Stones. There are no Dutch Beatles. What may be even more
fundamentally problematic than this lack of incentive is the fact that, with
respect to performers' rights, even the countries that traditionally adhere to
a natural rights rationale in intellectual property (unlike the U.K., whose
laws are informed by a utilitarian rationale) tend to view performers as
being of subsidiary importance, as compared with authors and composers.26
Thus, performers' rights are almost always temporally limited, even under
rights protection regimes that afford authors and composers perpetual
moral rights.27
Although the economic health of the recording industry (as well as
the industry's contribution to the cultural heritage) of Great Britain is at
stake, there are potential roadblocks to a solution. This dilemma presents a
controversial issue in the realm of international copyright law. This
Comment will explore this issue, and will argue in favor of the logic and
wisdom of extending the protection of performers' rights in the U.K. and
the E.U., so that the protection mirrors that which is available to the very
same artists in the U.S.
III. A COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND ON THE ANGLO AND CONTINENTAL
EUROPEAN SCHEMES IN BASIC COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
The philosophical underpinnings of modem statutory copyright law in
the United States and the United Kingdom date back to the Statute of Anne
24. Anderson Interview, supra note 9.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., J.A.L. Sterling, World Copyright Law: Protection of Authors' Works,
Performances, Phonograms, Films, Video, Broadcasts and Published Editions in National,
International and Regional Law 63 (1998); see also discussion infra Part III (comparing Anglo
schemes in copyright protection with those of Continental Europe, and delineating the differences
between utilitarian and natural rights theories of copyright protection).
27. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ADENEY, THE MORAL RIGHTS OF AUTHORS AND PERFORMERS:
AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 169, 215 (2006) (compare §§ 8.176, 8.177
(limitation on duration of performers' rights under French law), with §§ 8.18, 8.19 (perpetual
nature of authors' rights under French law)).
20071
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in Great Britain in 1710.28 The Statue of Anne represented the Crown's
recognition of an author's property right in his or her creation, as well as
the recognition that the public had the right to access to disseminations of
knowledge. 29 The British theory behind statutory (as opposed to common
law) intellectual property protection is a utilitarian one, based upon the
policy of promoting the dissemination of thought in the form of works of
art and science.30 Under this reasoning, an author 31 has a property right in
the product of his or her labor, but holds that right for only a limited period
of time.32 Subsequently, the product becomes the property of the general
populace-the public domain-thus balancing the author's right with the
policy of allowing the public access to artistic and scientific thought, as a
means of enhancing public welfare.33 This utilitarian argument persists as
one of the bedrock principles that animate intellectual property law in Great
Britain (and in America) to the present day.34
A competing rationale exists, however-one that has exerted
considerable influence over the nations of continental Europe.35 This
rationale is based upon what is said to be a "natural rights" or "inherent
entitlement" theory of law. 36  Under the natural rights view, a person is
entitled to ownership of the fruits of his or her labor.37 One of the most
influential spokespersons for this view was John Locke.38 In fact, it was
28. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.); see LEAFFERsupra note 10, at 4 (discussing
the historical development of the law of copyright).
29. See LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 4-5.
30. See id., supra note 10, at 4-5, 17-18; see also Timothy P. Best, Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Naxos of America, Inc.: The Persistence of Copyright on That Old Time Rock n' Roll, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 335, 342 (2006).
31. This Comment uses the terms author and composer interchangeably, unless otherwise
noted.
32. See LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 5.
33. See LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 4-5, 17-18, 24 (4th ed. 2005).
34. See id. at 18 (stating that copyright law also acted as an incentive system "designed to
produce an optimal quantity of works of authorship, and thereby enhance public welfare"). But
see Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 350-53 (1988)
(noting the subtle influence of the Hegelian "personality" rationale upon American copyright
law); see also JOYCE, ET AL., supra note 13, at 57 (noting that natural law (as opposed to
utilitarian) theories enjoy vitality in the discourse of British and American copyright law, and
"throughout the history of Anglo-American copyright... have been successfully deployed to
explain orjustify virtually every extension of the scope or intensity of copyright protection.").
35. LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 18.
36. Id.
37. Id. This right of ownership can be said to persist, theoretically, in perpetuity (although,
for practical reasons, it is limited, even under the natural rights rationale). See, e.g., STERLING,
supra note 26, at 381-83 (1998).
38. LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 18; see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT Ch. 5 (1690).
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under the natural rights philosophy that Great Britain had originally
conferred copyright protection under the common law, prior to the
enactment of the Statute of Anne. 39  The natural rights rationale for
copyright protection persisted in Great Britain, even after the enactment of
the Statute of Anne, until the decision in the case of Donaldson v. Beckett,
in 1774.40 After the Statute of Anne had been enacted, a successful
challenge was raised in Millar v. Taylor4 1-in essence, arguing that the
work of an author does carry inherent rights of possession. Donaldson
overturned Millar, and "has been construed as conclusive proof that natural
law has no place in copyright jurisprudence. 42 Nevertheless, the natural
rights rationale retained its vitality in the countries of Continental Europe,
and is responsible for the conception of the economic rights of authors
(droit d'auteur) in their works, and for the concept of droit moral that is
applied in France and (under various linguistic analogues) many of the
countries of the European Union.43 Droit moral "treats the author's
connection to [his or] her work not as a mere economic interest, but rather
as an inalienable, natural right, arising from a conception of the work as an
extension of the author's personality. 44 Together, droit d'auteur and droit
moral represent the fundamental principles underlying intellectual property
protection throughout much of Continental Europe.45
Today, the natural rights conception of intellectual property law can
still be seen in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Property of 1886 (revised at Paris in 1971),46 which, although it
accommodated the British viewpoint, was predominantly the creation of
Western European states. 47 The Berne Convention (seen by scholars of
39. For a thorough discussion of the evolution of the law of copyright in Great Britain, from
the origins of the philosophy of natural law (under ancient Roman law and, later, as conceived by
John Locke) through the modem statutory law, see Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law:
Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 522-29 (1990); see also Best, supra
note 30, at 342-49 (2006) (providing an analysis of the evolution of copyright law, beginning in
Great Britain, and continuing through the law as it is applied in the United States).
40. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 847 (H.L.).
41. Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 257.
42. Yen, supra note 39, at 528.
43. See generally LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 17-19 (discussing the natural law justification
for copyright protection, as an alternative to the utilitarian rationale); see also JOYCE, ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 548.
44. JOYCE, ET AL., supra note 13, at 548; see also ADENEY, supra note 27, at 168-72
(nature of droit moral).
45. See JOYCE, ET AL., supra note 13, at 27-29, 548-49.
46. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act of 1971),
art. 1 lbis(2).
47. See I STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING
RIGHTS 100-01 (2d ed. 1989).
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international law as a breakthrough in the custom of international
agreements generally, rather than merely with regard to intellectual
property rights) 48 heavily reflects the French/German concept of droit
d 'auteur.49
An alternative basis for the natural rights philosophy in law (but still
in contrast with the utilitarian model) comes from the German philosopher,
Hegel.5° Sometimes known as the personality model, this justification for
copyright protection follows from the premise that an author's works are
inseparably identified with that author's personality.5 For example, this
viewpoint is reflected not only in the French concept of droit moral, but
also in the U.S. under section 106A of the Copyright Act of 1976, which
grants the authors of visual works the right of attribution.52
In practice, the major difference, as between the utilitarian
formulation of rights protections in copyright law and the natural law
formulation, lies in the rationale that permits adherents to the former of
these two systems to place more restrictive temporal limits upon the
protection afforded to an author or musician than does the latter.53 A
protection regime grounded in a natural rights formulation can find
justification to protect authors indefinitely, under the concepts of droit
d'auteur and droit moral,54 while simultaneously limiting the duration of
protections afforded to performers.55 The reason for this differential
manner of treatment stems from an enduring unwillingness to view
performers as being on a par with authors, in terms of their inherent right to
ownership in their contributions to the creative process. 56 With regard to
performers' rights-i.e., the performers' and record companies' rights to
ownership in a recorded piece of music-under U.K. law, the limit to the
48. Id. at 101.
49. See generally id. (providing an exhaustive analysis of the Berne Convention).
50. JOYCE, ET AL., supra note 13, at 56-57; see also LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 20.
51. LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 20.
52. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
53. See DAVID SINACORE-GUINN, COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF COPYRIGHTS AND
NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, PROCEDURES, AND ORGANIZATIONS 137-
40(1993).
54. See id. at 113-14, 137, 140 (discussing the perpetual rights application ofdroit moral as
one of three ways in which the duration ofdroit moral is determined within various countries).
55. See, e.g., STERLING, supra note 26, at 63 (1998) ("[T]he general tendency of legislation
has been to regard the contribution of the performer as something different from that of the
author, and even.., as entitled to a lesser degree of protection.").
56. See, e.g., SINACOR-GUINN, supra note 53, at 794; see also STERLING, supra note 26, at
63 & n.86 (discussing the distinction between performers and authors, and providing, by way of
illustration, the example of the French legal distinction between lead performers and rank-and-
file-players).
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term of protection stands at fifty years.57 This limit is in keeping with the
harmonization that is mandated under European Union law, as embodied in
58the Term Directive.
A. Performers' Rights in the U.S.
Historically, in the U.S., no protection for sound recordings, under the
classification known as performers rights, existed within the federal law of
copyright. In fact, such a right was expressly excluded under the relevant
statute.59  Sound recordings themselves were not originally viewed by
Congress as subject to copyright protection, inasmuch as the initial
formulation of the statute encompassed only such works as could literally
be seen and read.60 In the 1908 case, White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the copyright protection of a
musical composition did not include a right covering the mechanical
reproduction of that work.61 There, the Court stated:
It may be true that in a broad sense a mechanical instrument
which reproduces a tune copies it; but this is a strained and
artificial meaning. When the combination of musical sounds is
reproduced to the ear it is the original tune as conceived by the
author which is heard. These musical tones are not a copy
which appeals to the eye. In no sense can musical sounds which
reach us through the sense of hearing be said to be copies, as
that term is generally understood, and as we believe it was
intended to be understood in the statutes under consideration. A
musical composition is an intellectual creation which first exists
in the mind of the composer; he may play it for the first time
upon an instrument. It is not susceptible of being copied until it
has been put in a form which others can see and read.6 2
In the year following White-Smith Music, Congress passed the
Copyright Act of 1909, which again omitted sound recordings from the
federal scheme of copyright protection.63 Sound recordings were finally
afforded federal copyright protection (prospectively, beginning in 1972)
57. See Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, Part II, § 191 (1988).
58. See Council Directive 93/98, art. 3.1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EEC).
59. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4), 114(a); see also LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 366-67.
60. See Best, supra note 30, at 335, 345.
61. See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (stating that music
encoded on player-piano rolls was not afforded copyright protection).
62. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
63. See Best, supra note 30, at 345-46.
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under a 1971 amendment to the federal statute.64 This legislation originally
had provided for preemption of state copyright law to begin on February
15, 2047, but was subsequently extended, such that federal preemption of
state common law protection now begins in 2067.65 The extension was the
result of efforts by former recording artist-turned-politician, Sonny Bono,
which resulted in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA).66
In addition to the enactment of the Sound Recordings Act of 1971, the
general scheme of copyright protection underwent further revision in 1976.
As the U.S. Supreme Court summarized these developments in the
landmark copyright case of Eldred v. Ashcroft:
In 1976, Congress altered the method for computing federal
copyright terms. For works created by identified natural
persons, the 1976 Act provided that federal copyright protection
would run from the work's creation, not-as in the 1790, 1831,
and 1909 Acts-its publication; protection would last until 50
years after the author's death. In these respects, the 1976 Act
aligned United States copyright terms with the then-dominant
international standard adopted under the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.67
Eldred v. Ashcrofi presented the Court with a challenge to the
constitutionality of Congress' power to enact the CTEA. 68 The petitioners
in Eldred argued that the "limited Times" language of the Constitution's
Copyright Clause 69 prohibited Congress from extending the term of
protection for existing works (the CTEA now protects the work for the life
of the author, plus seventy years). 70 The Court rejected that argument and
held that Congress had not exceeded its authority in extending the term of
protection.71
Although federal preemption of state copyright law can now take
effect as of the year 2067, at common law, states are free to develop rights
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (7) (2006) (see historical note stating "Enactment of Public Law
92-140 in 1971 ... marked the first recognition in American copyright law of sound recordings as
copyrightable works")
65. See Best, supra note 30, at 346.
66. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. 301(c) (2006)).
67. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194-5 (2003) (citations omitted).
68. See id. at 186.
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science ... by securing [to
authors] for limited Times ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writings").
70. See 537 U.S. 186 at 193.
71. Id. at 204.
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protections for sound recordings as they see fit.7 2  By far, the most
important decision applying state law, with respect to sound recordings, has
been the 2005 New York Court of Appeals decision in Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc.73 In Naxos, the court was called upon to
settle a series of questions that had previously remained unresolved under
New York state copyright law--one of which was, "[d]oes the expiration
of the term of a copyright in the country of origin terminate a common law
copyright in New York?' ,74 The court held that New York common law
copyright protection continued to protect a foreign work, even where that
work was no longer protected under the laws of its country of origin, and
even though the expiration of its term of protection in its country of origin
rendered it ineligible for protection under section 104(a) of the Copyright
Act of 1976."5
There has thus been a general trend in the United States toward
greater protection-as seen, for example, in the right of attribution granted
to visual artists, 7 6 in the holding of Naxos77 and in the rationale underlying
the CTEA. As the Court in Eldred pointed out, the CTEA was (in part)
inspired by a response to European copyright rationales:
The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically
makes, judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature's
domain.... [A] key factor in the CTEA's passage was a 1993
European Union [E.U.] directive instructing [E.U.] members to
establish [for authors] a copyright term of life plus 70
years.... Consistent with the Berne Convention, the [E.U.]
directed its members to deny this longer term to the works of
any non-[E.U.] country whose laws did not secure the same
extended term. By extending the baseline United States
copyright term to life plus 70 years, Congress sought to ensure
that American authors would receive the same copyright
protection in Europe as their European counterparts. The CTEA
may also provide greater incentive for American and other
authors to create and disseminate their work in the United
72. See 17 U.S.C. 301(c) (2006). See generally Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America,
Inc., 372 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing the background of the law of copyright).
73. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005).
74. 372 F.3d at 484 (certifying three questions of New York state law to the New York
Court of Appeals) (emphasis added).
75. See 830 N.E.2d at 265; see JOYCE, ET AL., supra note 13, at 197; Best, supra note 30, at
335-36.
76. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
77. See 830 N.E.2d at 250.
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States.78
B. Performers' Rights in the U.K. and E. U.: Background Developments
in the Law of Copyright Protection and the Creation of the "Neighboring
Rights"
1. The Berne Convention
At the international level, the first multilateral effort to address
copyright concerns was seen in the Berne Convention of 1886. 7 9  The
Beme Convention created a union of acceding states and, according to
Stephen M. Stewart (author of the treatise International Copyright and
Neighbouring Rights), "is a success story among international
conventions., 80 The Convention has been revised numerous times since its
inception, most recently at Paris in 1971 .81 The Berne Convention covers
"'literary and artistic works' [which] shall include every production in the
literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form
of its expression." 82  The Convention provides for a preclusion of
formalities for protection outside the country of origin of a particular
work-that is to say, within its country of origin, conditions precedent to
protection of a work may be imposed but, at the international level, no
formalities may be imposed.
83
2. The 1925 Dramatic and Musical Performers' Protection Act in the U.K.
In 1925, Great Britain first recognized performers' rights, under the
Dramatic and Musical Performers' Protection Act.84 The Act created a
criminal offense for infringement of performers' rights, but did not (at
least, ostensibly) create a civil right of action.85 This interpretation of the
1925 Act was put to the test in a famous case involving the making of
Alfred Hitchcock's film, Blackmail.86 There, the British court held that the
78. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205-06 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
79. See generally, STEWART, supra note 47 (providing an exhaustive analysis of the Berne
Convention).
80. Id. at 101 (2d ed. 1989).
81. See LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 564.
82. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act of 1971),
art. 2(1).
83. See id. at art. 5(2).
84. See ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 17-18.
85. See id. at 18.
86. Musical Performers' Prot. Ass'n v. British Int'l Pictures, Ltd., (1930) 46 T.L.R. 485
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1925 Act provided only a criminal penalty for infringement. 87
3. Revisions to the 1925 Act
In 1956, amendments to the 1925 Dramatic and Musical Performers'
Protection Act reiterated that the legal consequences of infringing
performers' rights were criminal, rather than civil, sanctions.88  The
amendment to the 1925 Act-known as the Copyright Act of 1956-
extended performers' rights into the realm of motion pictures, without
adding any other substantive provisions to the existing rights already
afforded performers under the 1925 Act. 89 Two years later, the Dramatic
and Musical Performers' Protection Act of 1958 combined the 1925 Act
and its 1956 amendments into a single Act. 90
4. The Rome Convention
The Rome Convention was to performers' rights what the Berne
Convention had been to authors' rights.9' Signed into international law in
1961 as the International Convention for the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms, and Broadcasting Organizations (and entering
into force in 1964), the Rome Convention set forth protections for persons
"whose involvement was derivative from that of the author in that by their
contribution (performance, recording, broadcast) they converted the
original work into a new form." 92 As Richard Arnold (author of the treatise
Performers' Rights) notes, a primary distinction between the manner in
which the Berne Convention had operated, and that of the Rome
Convention, was that the underlying purpose of the Rome Convention was
not to harmonize pre-existing international law, with respect to performers'
rights (for, in many countries, no such rights existed); rather, the purpose of
the Rome Convention was to create a new class of rights beneficiaries-
i.e., performers, as distinct from authors or composers.93 Because this class
of persons had previously enjoyed no protections under the laws of the
majority of European countries, those countries were then obliged to create
(K.B.).
87. ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 18-19.
88. Id. at 19.
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 20-21.
93. ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 21.
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those rights under their own laws.94 These laws would then be harmonized
under the Rome Convention, much as had authors' rights under the Berne
Convention. This, according to Arnold, was the true beginning of what
have come to be known as "neighbouring rights.,
95
Despite the groundbreaking nature of the Rome Convention, for a
variety of reasons connected with the special interests of broadcasters and
recording companies, performers were granted a somewhat lower level of
protection than were broadcasters and recording companies.96 Technically,
under the language of the Convention, broadcasters and recording
companies have "the right to authorize or prohibit" reproduction of their
product, whereas performers are given only "the possibility of preventing"
unauthorized reproduction of their performances. 97 There are numerous
additional ways in which performers were placed at a disadvantage, even as
they were in the process of receiving heretofore unrecognized rights under
the terms of the Rome Convention.98
5. Implementation of the Rome Convention in Great Britain
The Performers' Protection Act of 1963 implemented the Rome
Convention in Great Britain.99 This Act amended the 1958 Act by
expanding the protected class, but still failed to provide anything other than
a criminal sanction for violation.100 A later amendment to the Act in 1972
again did not provide a civil remedy but merely increased the criminal
penalties that were already available under the previous Acts.10
6. Expansion of the Remedies
The process whereby performers in the United Kingdom gained
access to a civil remedy for infringement of the rights that had been created
under the evolution of neighboring rights was played out in British courts
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. Compare The International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms, and Broadcasting Organizations, Art. 7(1) with Arts. 10 and 13; see also ARNOLD,
supra note 11, at 21-22 (analyzing the balancing process which the Rome Convention imposed
upon performers, record companies, and broadcasting companies, and elaborating upon the
rationale underlying the difference between performers' protections and those afforded to record
companies and broadcasters).
98. See, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 23.
99. Id. at 24.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 25.
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over the course of twenty years. °2
During this time, major decisions went back and forth-first in favor
of,10 3 then against, 104 and again in favor ofV °5 performers' right to a civil
remedy. 0 6 Meanwhile, the prospect of legislative reform had been under
consideration in the U.K. since the commissioning, in 1972, of a major
review of copyright law. 10 7 That review ultimately led to the enactment of
the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act of 1988.108
7. The Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act of 1988
The Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act of 1988 settled once and for
all the question as to whether there was a private right of civil action for
infringement of neighboring rights. 109 Part 11 of the Act "created two new
species of copyright which are referred to as 'performers' rights' and
'recording rights' respectively."' 10  Under the 1988 Act, protection
continues "until the end of the period of 50 years from the end of the
calendar year in which the performance takes place."11' It is this length of
protection that currently applies in the U.K. and that artists who are
concerned with the expiration of their rights advocate an extension to. 
2
8. The Term Directive
At the time when Great Britain was formally recognizing neighboring
102. See id. at 25-34 (discussing, in exhaustive detail, the evolution of the case law toward
provision of a civil remedy for infringement upon performers' rights in the U.K.).
103. Ex Parte Island Records, Ltd. [1978] Ch. 122, 123 (holding that a court in equity had
the right to grant performers and recording companies an ex parte injunction against
"bootleggers" of performances which were recorded, marketed, and distributed by recording
companies).
104. RCA v. Pollard [1983] Ch. 135 (holding that the Performers' Protection Acts provided
no private right of action upon which a performer or recording company could bring a claim
against a maker of, or dealer in, bootleg records).
105. Rickless v. United Artists Corp. [1988] 1 Q.B. 40 (holding that the 1958 Dramatic and
Musical Performers' Protection Act imposed not only a criminal penalty, but also a civil remedy,
where a performer or their performance was exploited without the performers written consent).
106. See ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 25-34 (discussing, in exhaustive detail, the evolution of
the case law toward provision of a civil remedy for infringement upon performers' rights in the
U.K.).
107. Id. at 34.
108. Id. at 35.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, Part II, § 191 (1988).
112. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 2; see also Jury, supra note 21; Anderson Interview,
supra note 9.
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rights as conferring a private right of action (with a term of protection
lasting for fifty years), the executive body of the European Union, the E.C.
Commission-formally known as the Commission of the European
Communities-began investigating ways in which to "create uniform and
improved Community-wide protection for copyright and related rights
owners." 113 The result was the passage of a series of Council Directives
(the means whereby law is enacted in the European Union), the most
important of which, for the purposes of the present discussion, was the so-
called Term Directive.'
1 4
The Term Directive provides a duration of protection that is
substantially identical to that of the British Copyright, Designs, and Patents
Act of 1988.115 One major effect of the Term Directive was its
implementation of reciprocity of treatment, under which non-Member State
nationals receive protection identical to that which is provided under the
laws of their own countries, rather than being subject to E.U. law.' 1 6 The
Term Directive was implemented in Great Britain in January of 1996,
under the Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations
of 1995, which amended the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of
1988.17 The Term Directive mandated harmonization among Member
States such that their terms of protection are equivalent-requiring
protection for performers for fifty years." 
8
9. TRIPs
In 1994, the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization incorporated another of the most significant international
trade agreements concerning performers' rights: the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)." 9  This
international agreement conferred a series of enumerated rights upon
performers with respect to their live performances, notably in the area of
113. ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 36.
114. Council Directive 1993/98, art. 3.1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EEC).
115. The Directive states that "[t]he rights of performers shall expire 50 years after the date
of the performance. However, if a fixation of the performance is lawfully published or lawfully
communicated to the public within this period, the rights shall expire 50 years from the date of
the first such publication or the first such communication to the public, whichever is the earlier."
Id.
116. ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 37.
117. Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations, 1995, S.t. 1995/3297,
Part I § 3(a) (U.K.).
118. Council Directive 93/98, (2) 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EEC); STERLING, supra note 26, at
699.
119. ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 39.
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recordation or broadcast of those performances.12  The term of protection
is set at fifty years, which begins either from the end of the calendar year in
which the performance took place, or from the date on "which the fixation
was made.'' 2 1 TRIPs also gives an exclusive rental right to producers of
phonograms (and other rights holders in phonograms, as specified under
the laws of Member States). 122 The impact of TRIPs has been a large-scale
expansion of the scope of performers' rights, by extending such rights into
the realm of live performance insofar as those performances are relevant to
broadcast and reproduction for sales. 1
23
10. WIPO: Performances and Phonograms Treaty
In 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) held a
Diplomatic Conference, which resulted in the passage of two significant
new treaties: the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The underlying proposals which
ultimately resulted in these treaties had been specifically aimed at
"strengthen[ing] performers' rights, including... granting performers
moral rights, providing performers with a right in respect of the
broadcasting of recordings of their performances and extending the term of
protection to 50 years .... The [Performances and Phonograms] Treaty
was signed on December 20, 1996, and entered into force on May 20,
2002. ''I24 One of the reasons why the WPPT is significant is because of its
expanded emphasis upon moral rights for performers: "Not only are
[performers] afforded more extensive economic rights [under the Treaty],
but the text provides explicitly for the basic moral rights of the performer
'as regards... live aural performances [sic] fixed in phonograms. 1, 25
Thus, in the progression of legislative and international treaty
developments over the past fifty years, it is possible to see not only an ever-
increasing recognition of the rights of performers in recorded musical
works, but also an increasingly prevalent reliance upon a moral rights
120. See, e.g., id. 39 (3d ed. 2004).
121. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 372 (1994); see also ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 39
(citing Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 14(5)).
122. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 121, at 372; see also Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 14(4).
123. See ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 39-40.
124. Id. at 40-41.
125. LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 565 (citing World Intellectual Property Organization
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 5(1), Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs wo034.html.).
2007]
400 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:383
justification for the creation and expansion of those rights.
Notwithstanding the evidence of a progression toward greater protection of
performers' rights, the performers working during the time period in which
this heightened recognition has been occurring risk seeing the protection
expire. It is unfortunate that the primary impediment to a remedy for this
state of affairs might not originate from within the U.K.126  Instead,
opposition could come in its strongest form from the countries of
Continental Europe. In these countries, although the protection of
performers' rights proceeds, ostensibly, from a natural rights rationale,
127
the fundamental conception of performers sets them in a position inferior to
that of authors. 2 8 Thus, even under a moral rights regime of protection,
performers are afforded only limited term protection for economic rights.
129
IV. THE CURRENT DEBATE IN THE U.K.
The current debate in the U.K. centers upon arguments that are most
seriously embraced by those who had performed on British sound
recordings dating from the 1950s through the 1960s, and by the music
industry companies that share in the economic benefits of such
protection. 30  According to Ian Anderson's estimate, musical recordings
which are of British origin comprise approximately forty percent of the
entire corpus of popular music of the time period, worldwide. 3 ' The
expiration of protection for these works carries potentially deleterious
effects for the performers on those records, for the record labels, and for the
budding talent of tomorrow. 32 Emerging talent faces considerable risk of
never seeing the light of day, as it is, especially under the current economic
duress with which the recording industry is beset. This economic duress
will simply be exacerbated when revenues from major-selling catalogues-
such as those of the Beatles and the Rolling Stones--dry up in the U.K. due
126. The country whose original model for statutory protection has been utilitarian in
nature, and therefore more justifiably susceptible of time-limitation than would, perhaps, be true
in a country that follows a natural rights-oriented scheme of protection. See supra Part III.
127. The natural rights rationale traditionally leads its adherents to resist time limitation,
with respect to the moral rights protections that are enjoyed by authors.
128. See, e.g., STERLING, supra note 26, at 63 (discussing how performers are viewed as
merely presenters).
129. See, e.g., ADENEY, supra note 27, at 214-15 (discussing the duration of performers'
rights, under French law).
130. See, e.g., Anderson Interview, supra note 9; see generally Jury, supra note 21
(discussing the alarm of record companies with 1950's artists come out of protection).
131. Anderson Interview, supra note 9.
132. See, e.g., id.
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to their transition into the public domain.133
There are a number of different voices, and a variety of rationales,
arguing for reform of the protections that are afforded performers' rights in
the U.K. Richard Arnold, one of the leading copyright scholars in the
U.K., advances the position that "performers' exclusive rights should be
upgraded to full property rights so as to be assignable and otherwise
transmissible to the same extent as other copyrights, rather than to the
limited extent provided at present.', 134 Indeed, as Arnold points out, in the
majority of member states in the European Community, such rights are
assignable. 35 This view of performers' rights is more in line with the
natural rights theory of copyright protection (the original basis for common
law protection of copyright in the U.K.) 136 than with the utilitarian view
that had given rise to statutory copyright protection in the first place. As
Ian Anderson has written:
If I can own the freehold, and thus the investment, in my home
property, why can't the value of the investment in my recordings
be a longer-term or even indefinite heritable, saleable right? I
would have better protection as the bricks-and-mortar builder of
my house than a "builder" of recorded music. 137
Arnold's point of view is substantially similar: "[i]t is hard to see
why performers and their heirs should be prejudiced by comparison with
other copyright owners in this way.,"138 It should be noted that, here,
Arnold is discussing the depth of performers' rights protections in the U.K.
as opposed to those in the E.U. (under reasoning similar to that which
informs droit d'auteur), whereas, in contrast, Anderson is discussing the
duration of such protections (under reasoning more closely resembling the
basis of droit moral). Nevertheless, both of these aspects of performers'
rights protections are dependent upon identical policy rationales, as
between the utilitarian versus natural rights theories. As such, Anderson's
and Arnold's assertions each simply present a different facet of the same
issue. 1
39
Unlike Anderson, Arnold has apparently abandoned the notion of an
extension beyond the current fifty-year term of performers' rights
133. Id.
134. ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 47.
135. Id.
136. See discussion supra Part III.
137. Anderson, supra note 2.
138. ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 47.
139. See Anderson, supra note 2; see also RICHARD ARNOLD, PERFORMERS' RIGHTS 50 (3d
ed. 2004).
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protection. 40 Arnold notes that, in the first edition of his book, he had
argued in favor of exactly this point, but that, "[w]ith the advent of the
Term Directive, this is now a dead issue for the foreseeable future."' 141 But
Arnold is a legal scholar and Anderson is a recording artist. Ian Anderson
endeavors to speak not only for a generation of recording artists of the
heyday of classic popular music from Great Britain, but also for the
recording industry itself and, more philosophically, for what he sees as a
piece of the cultural heritage of Great Britain. 142 Anderson-along with
others who advocate on behalf of performers for an extension to
performers' rights under U.K. law-does not take it on faith that this
represents a dead issue. 143 This is likely due to performers' vested interest
in seeing the term of protection extended. Nevertheless, the reality is that
term of protection is harmonized under E.U. law by the provisions of the
Term Directive, and thus would require a pan-European change in that law
in order to have effect.
144
Countervailing arguments-some of which advocate continuing to
afford performers a lesser degree of protection than that afforded to
authors, and some of which would advocate the outright refusal of such
protection for performers-tend to run along the same lines as those which
advocate against granting copyright in the first place. '4' These arguments
include the notions that: (1) such rights give rise to an unjust monopoly
upon information; (2) such rights are merely a means whereby commercial
interests exploit the labor of artists; (3) such rights place a harmful
restriction upon trade; (4) such rights allow developed nations to exploit
undeveloped nations economically; (5) rights protections place a tax upon
information and knowledge, thus preventing the spread of ideas; and (6) the
idea that protections which endure beyond the artist's lifetime benefit a
class of persons not responsible for the work itself.146 Thus, a partial list of
potential objections to the extension of the term of performers' rights
protections in the U.K. shows that such objections mirror the centuries-old
debate surrounding the need (or lack thereof) for copyright protection in
general. More specifically, many countries that embrace the natural rights
view of copyright view performers as less-worthy rights-holders, compared
140. See ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 50.
141. Id.
142. See Anderson Interview, supra note 9.
143. See Anderson, supra note 2.
144. See discussion, supra Part II.
145. See STERLING, supra note 26, at 71.
146. Id. at 61-62.
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to authors. 47 At an even greater level of specificity, there are arguments
merely against the extension of performers' rights protections beyond their
current term. 148 The majority of these arguments are grounded in economic
considerations, and do not take into account the philosophical rationales for
granting performers greater protection, in the form of extended duration of
that protection. 1
49
Despite the existence of compelling arguments for why performers'
rights should be afforded an extension beyond their current fifty-year term
of protection, 150 it is likely that Parliament will give short-shrift to
consideration of this issue, at least in the near future. In his discussion with
the author, Ian Anderson expressed considerable pessimism with regard to
Parliamentary consideration, specifically in light of events such as the
terrorist bombings, in London, in the summer of 2006-events which have
placed concerns over internal terrorist threats, and the security of the civil
aviation system in Europe, at center stage.
15
Regardless of whether British Parliament chooses to ignore calls for
an extension to performers' rights due to a current preoccupation with
matters of national security, the concerns expressed by Anderson, as well
as by similarly disposed individuals and groups, represent an issue that will
not go away. The transition into the public domain of recorded music from
Great Britain will only accelerate, as the fifty-year mark progressively
overtakes more of the recordings that were made during the formative years
of rock & roll. By the year 2017, there will be a landslide of such
transitioning material underway in the U.K., and those who stand to lose
profits are not apt to fall silent in the face of such developments.
A. The Gowers Review of Intellectual Property Law
The Gowers Review of Intellectual Property ("Review") is of central
importance to the British government's disposition regarding the prospect
for an extension to the term of performers' rights protections. 52  In
December 2005, at Great Britain's Enterprise Conference, British
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown commissioned a review of
147. See ADENEY, supra note 27, at 214-15 (discussing the limits of performers' rights,
under French law).
148. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV- A.
149. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV- A.
150. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV- A.
151. Anderson Interview, supra note 9.
152. ANDREW GOWERS, HM TREASURY, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/583/91/pbrO6_gowers-report_755.pdf.
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intellectual property rights in Great Britain. 153  Brown named Andrew
Gowers to head this review.1 54 At the time of his appointment by Brown,
Gowers was the editor of the Financial Times,' 55 an influential
international business news publication arguably on par with The Wall
Street Journal. The audience for the Review was Gordon Brown, the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, and the Secretary of State for
Culture, Media and Sport.
156
Gowers' appointment resulted in the Call for Evidence, a solicitation
of comments, opinions, and recommendations for the future on intellectual
property law in Great Britain.157  Although the Review is an all-
encompassing look at the current state of intellectual property law, an
extension to the term of neighboring rights protections is but a sub-topic
within it.' 58 The Gowers' Call for Evidence described the Review's goal
and expressly acknowledged the international character of the issues:
The Review will ... fulfil [sic] the Government's existing
commitment to examine whether the current term of protection
on sound recordings and performers' rights in sound recordings
is appropriate. In many cases the Review's recommendations
will focus on how the Government might address these issues
domestically. However, much of IP policy is agreed in an
international context, and is often subject to [E.U.] legislation or
international treaties and conventions. The Review may
therefore also make policy recommendations at the international
level, considering how best the Government can continue to take
a lead internationally. It will bear in mind the need to balance
the Government's aims of promoting innovation, openness to
trade and investment, and international development concerns.
It will also consider how best to influence the European
Commission's agenda on intellectual property policy in the
[E.U.], including its review of legislation on copyright and
153. See id. at § E5.
154. Open Rights Group, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property,
http://gowers.openrightsgroup.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
155. Andrew Gowers, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AndrewGowers (last
visited October 22, 2006).
156. See Johanna Gibson, The Gowers Review of Intellectual Property - Valuable Affair,
SCRIPT-ED, 11; see also GOWERS, supra note 152.
157. GOWERS, supra note 152, §§ ElO, B.2 (noting that the Call for Evidence produced
responses from 517 individuals and organizations; a comprehensive list of respondents is
reprinted at Annex B of the Review).
158. See id. §§ 4.42-4.47.
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related rights. 1
59
The specific questions posed in the Call for Evidence provide an
inside glimpse into the issues that are especially important in considering
neighboring rights protections; these questions were as follows:
1. What are your views on this issue? 2. Is there evidence to
show the impact that a change in term would have on
investment, creativity, and consumer interests? 3. Are you
aware of the impact that different lengths of term have had on
investment, creativity, and consumer interests in other
countries? 4. Are there alternative arrangements that could
accompany an extension of term (e.g. licence [sic] of right for
any extended term)? 5. If term were to be extended, should it be
extended retrospectively (for existing works) or solely for new
creations? 
160
It is thus clear that, in the eyes of policy-makers, the central areas of
concern relate to investment, creativity, and consumer interests. Likewise,
Ian Anderson, (and other advocates of an extension to term) advance
incentives to forward-looking investment by record labels, and the
nurturance of creativity on the part of recording artists as important
components to the argument, although their arguments rest additionally
upon a natural rights philosophy.
161
At a launch party for the Call for Evidence, Andrew Gowers presided
over a pair of panel discussions. 162  The first panel was devoted to
patents. 163  The second was devoted to matters affecting copyright
protection, and featured Jill Johnstone, Head of Policy for the National
Consumer Council; Anthony Lilley, Chief Executive of Magic Lantern
Productions; Emma Pike, Chief Executive of British Music Rights; and
Jonathan Cornthwaite, Head of Intellectual Property Law for Wedlake Bell
Solicitors. 164 With respect to the issue of performers' rights protections,
"[s]everal individuals in the open discussion, including representatives
from EMI and Phonographic Performance Limited (a collecting society for
performers)[,] argued for an extension of term (and revival, that is,
including past performances) for performers' rights.... on the basis that
these rights are incentives to the creative process."'' 65 While this argument
159. Open Rights Groups, supra note 154.
160. GOWERS, supra note 152, at 138.
161. See, e.g., Anderson Interview, supra note 9; see also Anderson, supra note 2.
162. See Gibson, supra note 156, at 11.
163. See id. at 12.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 13.
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is in line with that espoused by Anderson, and by others who are at the
front lines of creativity in the promulgation of recorded musical works,
166
there are many (including Dr. Gibson) who find such a rationale for
extending performers' rights to be singularly unpersuasive.
Dissenters argue that those who create works-whether literary,
visual, or musical-will do so regardless of the legal framework that is in
place, simply because artistic endeavor knows no economic calculus for its
impetus.' 67  For example, Dr. Gibson believes the economic incentive
argument is unpersuasive because "performers' economic rights, at least in
their modem form, did not exist until their introduction in 1996.16S
Nevertheless, the argument for extension of term in connection with
performers' rights stands, to some degree, apart from debates regarding
incentives to creativity, insofar as such debates more properly revolve
around the rights of persons who are authors or composers. The reason for
this difference lies in the fact that in the performers' rights context, the
right is, by definition, derivative. 169  Thus, despite the natural rights
philosophical basis for the argument in favor of extended term of
protection, the creative-incentive debate necessarily takes on a somewhat
different cant-i.e., that of the more economics-driven incentive-to-
investment debate.17
0
As an illustration of the incentive-to-investment rationale that would
bear upon a proposed increase in the duration of performers' rights (as
opposed to, for example, authors' rights), one might look to the
justification proffered by the United States Supreme Court in upholding the
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act as it was applicable
to existing copyrights.' 71 The Court noted that a specific Legislative intent
in the passage of the Act was predicated upon "rationally credited
projections that longer terms would encourage copyright holders to invest
in the restoration and public distribution of their works.' ' 72 Indeed, what
could be more "on point" for those who stand to benefit the most from an
extension to the term of neighboring rights in the U.K. and in the E.U.-
namely, the non-composer performers of recorded music and, specifically,
166. Anderson Interview, supra note 9.
167. See, e.g., GOWERS, supra note 152, § 4.32.
168. Gibson, supra note 156, at 13 (emphasis added); see also text supra Part II.B-10.
169. See ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 13.
170. See, e.g., GOWERS, supra note 152, §§ 4.30-4.33.
171. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 (2003) (citing H. R. Rep. No. 105-452, p. 4
(1998), which discusses the fact that a term extension "provides copyright owners generally with
the incentive to restore older works and further disseminate them to the public").
172. Id. at 207 (citing Brief for Respondent).
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the record labels that manufacture and distribute the products of such
performers' work?
Arguments against an extension of performers' rights necessarily
encompass those which have traditionally been advanced in opposition to
the basic establishment of performers' rights in the first place. In his book,
Performers' Rights, Richard Arnold enumerated many of those
fundamental arguments, and the refutations available to each., 73 He began
with the notion that performance itself-e.g., the accompaniment of a
session musician on a recorded work-is dependent upon, and therefore
subsidiary to, authorship. 174 Indeed, it is on the basis of this reasoning that
performers' rights derive their designation as "neighboring" rights.
1 75
Another argument is that granting rights to performers will place authors,
such as composers of musical works, at a legal disadvantage. 176 Third,
there are those that argue that performers' rights are more properly the
province of union negotiations, rather than copyright law, while still others
point out the impracticability of granting rights to the numerous performers
who might be involved in complex works-for example, a symphonic
work. 77 Some people believe performance is intrinsically transitory and,
therefore, not deserving of protection. 178 This argument carries little force
under modem technological regimes because recorded music is, for all
practical purposes, fixed in perpetuity) 79  Some would argue that a
performer can only benefit from free reproduction of a recorded work, on
the theory that the performer's reputation will be thereby enhanced. 80
There is also the notion that "granting performers rights is anti-
competitive.' 181  Additionally, Arnold describes what he calls a
"floodgates" argument, i.e., "if you grant rights to performers, others may
start demanding rights, such as sportsmen."'
' 82
As Arnold points out, however, each of the arguments enumerated
above may be refuted. 183  The performance-as-subsidiary-to-authorship
argument does not satisfy the question as to why such performance is
173. ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 7-10.
174. Id. at 7.
175. See id. at 7-10.
176. See id. at 8.
177. Id. at 7-10.
178. Id. at 9.
179. ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 9.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 10.
183. See id. at 7-8.
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"either economically or morally less deserving of protection."' 18 4  The
prejudice-to-authors argument fails in the face of evidence that the market
is sufficiently elastic to have proven that "no evidence has ever been found
that authors' remuneration has fallen as the result of the granting rights to
performers."' 185  The union-negotiations-as-appropriate-forum argument
ignores the fact that there is still a need for a legal framework as a
reference for any collective bargaining negotiations.' 86  Situations
involving large numbers of performers on a single work can be addressed
under collective licensing agreements.' 87  Performers, whose reputations
are enhanced via free reproduction of their works, still prefer to retain
control over the reproduction of their works and, consequently, their
remuneration for such reproduction. 88 The anti-competitiveness argument
does not address the corollary question as to "whether unauthorised [sic]
exploitation of performances is fair competition which ought to be
restrained."' 189  The floodgates argument, has yet to be borne out by
experience and, as Arnold points out, it may not necessarily be a bad thing
if sportsmen began to demand performers' rights.' 90
The Gowers Review systematically refutes the arguments in favor of
the extension of performers' rights protections. 191 On behalf of the British
government, Chancellor Brown accepted the Review's recommendations at
the time they were reported in December 2006.192 The Review listed the
following arguments (culled from the Call for Evidence) in support of
extending the term of protection for sound recordings:
(1) parity with other countries; in the USA, sound recordings are
protected for 95 years. In Australia and Brazil the term of
protection is 70 years;
(2) fairness; currently composers have copyright protection for
life plus 70 years, whereas performers and producers only have
rights for 50 years. Such a disparity is unfair;
184. Id.
185. ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 8.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 8-9.
188. Id. at 9; see also, Jury, supra note 21 (discussing the dissatisfaction of performers in
the U.K., with respect to the current term of performers' rights protection in Great Britain and the
E.U.).
189. ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 9.
190. Id. at 10.
191. See generally GOWERS, supra note 152.
192. E-mail from Dr. Johanna Gibson, Reader in Intellectual Property Law, Queen Mary
Intellectual Property Research Institute, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary
University of London, to the author (Jan. 31, 2007, 153:16 PM EST) (on file with author).
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(3) extension of term would increase the incentives to invest in
new music; the 'incentives argument' claims that increasing
term would encourage more investment, as there would be
longer to recoup any initial outlay;
(4) extension of term would increase [the] number of works
available; copyright provides incentives for rights holders to
make works available to the public as it gives rights holders a
financial incentive to keep work commercially available; and
(5) maintain[ing] the positive trade balance; the UK has an
extremely successful music industry. The UK industry has
between a 10 per cent and 15 per cent share of the global
market. In 2004, the UK sector showed a trade surplus of £83.4
million, earning £238.9 million in export incomes.
193
After consulting widely, and relying largely upon the results of an
economic analysis commissioned by the Review (from the Centre for
Intellectual Property and Information Law, at Cambridge University
["CIPIL"]194), the Review "carefully considered each of these arguments in
turn.' 
19 5
1. Parity with Other Countries
In response to the claim that an extension of the term for performers'
rights protections would foster parity with other countries, the Review
suggests that the breadth of protection offered in the U.K. favorably offsets
a shorter duration (as compared to the U.S.) offered for such protection.'
96
Noting that the term of protection is currently fifty years in the E.U., and
ninety-five years in the U.S., the Review points out that U.S. copyright law
contains an exception to the requirement of royalties for performances in
bars and similar public venues. 197  Additionally, royalties for radio
performances in the U.S. are paid only in the context of digital radio, as
opposed to the U.K. where the law mandates royalties for all radio
performances. 98 Under an economic analysis comparing the two systems,
the Review concludes that "[i]t is therefore possible that the total royalties
received in the EU is no less than, and may even be more than, those
193. GOWERS, supra note 152 § 4.22 (citations omitted).
194. Id. § 4.21.
195. Id. § 4.22.
196. See id. § 4.23.
197. Id. (citations omitted).
198. Id.
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received in the USA." 199 Despite the relatively perfunctory nature of the
economic analysis that the Review cites in support of its conclusion, the
Review dispenses with the first argument proffered in support of an
extension to the term of protection.
Additionally, the Review examines the claim that the longer term of
protection in the U.S. has been responsible for drawing British artists away
from U.K. recording contracts.20 0 The Review finds that there is "no
evidence of UK bands choosing to sign to US labels based on copyright
term," and that, "[i]n fact, there is anecdotal evidence that bands from the
USA are signing to UK labels to develop in a vibrant music scene. 20 1
One could plausibly question how the Review's "anecdotal evidence"
is more persuasive than opposing evidence of precisely the same nature.
The Review's assertion that the motivation for bands' signature with U.K
record labels is "to develop in a vibrant music scene" 20 2 seems optimistic,
at best. The Review appears to ignore the distinct possibility that, given the
realities faced by bands attempting to break into the recording industry, it is
manifestly possible that most bands merely sign with the first label that
evinces a willingness to offer them a contract.
2. Fairness, as Between Composers and Performers
In answering the charge of unequal treatment, as between performers
and composers, the Review finds that "it is not clear that extending [the]
term [of protection] from 50 years to 70 or 95 years would remedy the
unequal treatment of performers and producers from composers, who
benefit from life plus 70 years [of] protection. 2 0 3 Tacitly acknowledging
that one of the central tenets of copyright and neighboring rights
protections (as those protections currently stand in the U.K.) is grounded in
the utilitarian notion that protection provides an incentive to creators, while
its limitation benefits the public,20 4 the Review attacks the incentive
argument directly.20 5 Offering economic evidence in support of the view
that sufficient creative incentive already exists (for performers as well as
authors), the Review cites, inter alia, its own commissioned CIPIL study,
which analyzed figures obtained from PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC)
199. GOWERS, supra note 152, § 4.23 (citing Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c.
48, §§ 20, 182C(A), 182D (Eng.)).
200. Id. § 4.24.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. § 4.28.
204. See id. § 4.26.
205. GOWERS, supra note 152, § 4.27.
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under the auspices of the British Phonographic Industry (presumably in
response to the Call for Evidence).2 °6
According to the Review, CIPIL's figures (based upon the PWC data)
show that the Net Present Value (NPV) of the proposed alteration to term
would be only one percent,20 7 and that the benefit would be unevenly
distributed.20 8 The lion's share of additional profit would be given to the
more successful performers whose works remain in circulation beyond the
current fifty-year term.20 9 Additionally, the Review appears to sidestep the
issue of potential benefits under the proposed extension to term by offering
figures to support the assertion that royalties obtained under the current
scheme of protection are low to begin with, and are superseded by other
sources of revenue (such as name-recognition). 2 10 Furthermore, the Review
suggests that the place to look for a remedy is not within the law of
neighboring rights but, rather, in the specific contractual infrastructure of
the recording industry.2 11
The Review thus demonstrates a remarkable willingness to base
conclusions on reasoning that says, essentially: Why grant more protection
to those who are unfairly treated, since, even within those ranks, there is a
hierarchy of success already, and those who are currently at the bottom will
nevertheless remain at the bottom? Such reasoning overlooks both the fact
that the entire group would benefit-including those at the bottom-and
the fact that even those at the top are not currently receiving benefits
commensurate with those enjoyed by top composers. Additionally, this
rationale for declining to extend the term of protection is not in keeping
with fundamental free-market, capitalist economics. In other words,
performers may compete with one another, and let the best of them prevail.
It makes little sense to refuse to improve the lot of the group simply
because some members of that group will prevail over others.
The Review's assertion-that the benefits conferred upon a performer
in the form of revenue derived from name recognition outweighs the
royalties-derived portion of his or her income 2-appears to disregard the
Review's immediately preceding acknowledgement: that the vast majority
of performers do not enjoy sufficient status within the industry to collect
206. Id. § 4.29.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. (citing Box 4.2).
211. GOWERS, supra note 152, § 4.29 (citing Box 4.2).
212. Id. (citing Box 4.2).
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royalties beyond the current fifty-year term of protection.213 It is difficult
to imagine how a performer who will, arguably, not benefit much from an
extended term of protection, due to his or her relatively diminutive stature
within the pantheon of recording personalities, could nevertheless be
adequately compensated for his or her unequal status (relative to
composers) by what the Review calls their "celebrity status. 214
3. Increased Term as Incentive to Future Investment
In refuting the assertion that an extension to term will increase record
companies' incentives to invest in new acts,215 the Review marshals as its
strongest argument the views expressed in an amicus brief to the U.S.
Supreme Court in the case of Eldred v. Ashcroft.216 Eldred presented the
Court with a challenge to Congress' power to enact the CTEA. 217  The
amicus brief cited by the Review proffered the opinions of numerous
economists, in support of (according to the Review) the proposition that an
extension to the term of copyright protection would have little or no effect
upon investment decisions.218 The economists' calculations tended to show
that an extension to term would provide a relatively miniscule NPV (again,
on the order of one percent).2 19 According to the Review's summary of the
amicus brief, these economists "conclude ... that an extension of term has
negligible effect on investment decisions. '220 The point, according to the
Review, is that prospective returns which lie more than fifty years from the
actual time of investment do not serve to provide an incentive to such
investment.2 1
Unfortunately, the Review's citation to the brief of amicus curiae in
Eldred is misplaced, due to the disparity of contexts in which the Review
and the amicus brief treat the subject of investment.222 The section of the
213. Id.
214. Id. (citing Box 4.2).
215. Id. §§4.30-31.
216. See id. § 4.31 (citing Brief for George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]).
217. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003); see also discussion supra, Part III.A (the
CTEA, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)-(c) (2006), increased the term of protection for existing and future
copyrights to life-plus-70 years, and protection for works for hire was increased to 95 years from
the date of publication, or 120 years from creation, whichever expires first).
218. GOWERS, supra note 152, § 4.31 (citing Amicus Brief, supra note 216).
219. Id. (citing Amicus Brief, supra note 216).
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. Compare id. §§ 4.31-4.33 (discussing and refuting the argument that an extension to
the term of protection for performers' rights would provide incentives to record companies to
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Review in which this discussion appears is intended to refute the argument
that an extension will provide incentives to record companies to invest in
the future success of new artists. 223 As the Review makes clear, "in order
for the incentive argument to hold, it must be shown that prospective
extension of copyright term for sound recordings would increase the
incentives for record companies to invest in new acts.,2 24 Indeed, such is
precisely the contention of supporters of an extension.225
Meanwhile, the brief of amicus curiae in Eldred deals not with
incentives to record companies to invest in future acts, but rather with
incentives to authors to invest in future returns by creating in the present
day.226 It is in this latter context that the increase in value provided by an
extension would be of negligible effect, according to the brief.227 The brief
speaks in terms of authors' incentives, rather than those of record
companies or publishers, although it is in that context (i.e. corporate
decision-making) that the Review seeks to employ the data from the
brief.228 The brief does, in a single paragraph, touch upon the fact that
investment strategy, on the part of large media corporations, is informed by
profit-maximization based upon expected returns as compared with cost of
capital. 229 According to the brief:
[i]f [a] producer has resources remaining, after funding all the
projects whose expected returns are higher than the cost of
capital, this remainder should be invested elsewhere, not in sub-
par projects that happen to be available to the firm .... [Thus]
its incentives will not be improved from the mere fact of a
windfall from consumers.23 °
The brief's comment upon investment strategy ignores the fact that it
is an integral part of the ongoing business of media enterprises such as
record companies to take risks by investing capital in un-proven, emerging
talent. Additionally, even this abbreviated treatment of corporate
investments is offered by the authors of the brief only to refute the
maintain an ongoing supply of new music), with Amicus Brief, supra note 216 (discussing the
CTEA in terms of its arguably negligible effect upon artists' incentives to create new works).
223. See GOWERS, supra note 152, § 4.22.
224. Id. § 4.30 (emphasis added).
225. See, e.g., Anderson Interview, supra note 9 (arguing that an extension to term would
give record companies not merely an incentive to invest in new acts, but also the fundamental
continuing ability to so invest).
226. See generally Amicus Brief, supra note 216.
227. See id.
228. See id.; see also GOWERS, supra note 152, §§ 4.30-4.33.
229. See Amicus Brief, supra note 216, at 8-9.
230. Id. at 9.
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argument that "the windfall to authors of existing copyrights has a positive
consequence, by providing them with more resources for additional
creative projects.' 23' What is argued by those who support an extension to
the term of performers' rights is, however, subtly different: i.e., not that an
extension will result in a "windfall to authors of existing copyrights," thus
"providing them with more resources for additional creative projects. '232
Rather, what is argued in the context of the debate in the U.K. surrounding
a proposed extension is that such an extension will enhance record
companies' ability to invest in talent which has yet to hold any copyrights
whatsoever (i.e., new artists), and to do so as a regular practice, rather than
merely to provide additional funding to any particular existing copyright
holder.233 Thus, it is misleading of the Review to employ the briefs
(cursory) treatment of corporate investment strategy in support of the
Review's attempt at refuting the incentive to investment argument.
Because the amicus brief cited by the Review cannot be said to
squarely address the incentive-to-investment argument in the corporate
context, the Review mischaracterizes the single document that is marshaled
in support of its refutation of that argument. The amicus brief is primarily
devoted to the utility to existing authors of an extension, in the form of
incentive to create.234 One need not be a sophisticated economist to
speculate that, whereas a single author might not be influenced by
prospective returns on a single work (calculated to come to fruition more
than fifty years in the future), a large corporation such as a major record
label might indeed factor such returns-theoretically from a multiplicity of
acts-into present-day investment decisions.
Additionally, it should be noted that discussion of the amicus brief
(noted with such approval by the Review 235) occurs in Eldred as part of
Justice Breyer's dissent in that case.236 Although the constitutional issue in
Eldred was whether or not Congress had overstepped its authority in
passing the CTEA,237 the majority looked to the legislative history of the
CTEA and the dissenting opinions to economic data, in support of their
opinions regarding Congress' adherence to the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution, with respect to the Copyright Clause.238 In the end, the
231. Id. at 8-9.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Anderson Interview, supra note 9.
234. See Amicus Brief, supra note 216.
235. See GOWERS, supra note 152, § 4.31.
236. 537 U.S. at 254-55, 267 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
237. See id. at 192-94.
238. See, e.g., id. passim. The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution confers upon
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majority in Eldred held that "Congress passed the CTEA in light of
demographic, economic, and technological changes, and rationally credited
projections that longer terms would encourage copyright holders to invest
in the restoration and public distribution of their works."2 39 "Satisfied that
the legislation before [the Court] remains inside the domain the
Constitution assigns to the First Branch," the Supreme Court upheld the
passage of the CTEA. 240  Thus, the Review's heavy reliance upon the
economic data presented in the amicus brief could be viewed as a
somewhat desperate gambit to adduce evidence in support of the Review's
findings.
The Review briefly addresses a variation of its argument that an
extension to term would provide an incentive for companies to invest in
new artists. 241 The Review dismisses this argument, stating, "[t]his seems
highly unlikely given there are a large number of bands already creating
music without any hope of a financial return." 242  In support of this
proposition, the Review quotes a performer named Dave Rowntree (of the
British rock groups Blur and The Ailerons), who finds the idea that creative
incentives could be based upon term of protection "laughable.
2 43
On the other hand, in Eldred, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this
same argument in favor of term extension.244 There, the Court allowed that
Congress could reasonably be persuaded by the House and Senate hearings
committee testimonies of Quincy Jones, Bob Dylan, Don Henley, and
Carlos Santana. 245 As the Court noted, "each [of these artists] expressed
the belief that the copyright system's assurance of fair compensation for
themselves and their heirs was an incentive to create. 246 The Court noted,
"[w]e would not take Congress to task for crediting this evidence which, as
[even dissenting] Justice Breyer acknowledges, reflects general
'propositions about the value of incentives' that are 'undeniably true.' '2 47
Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
239. 537 U.S. at 206-07 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
240. Id. at 222.
241. See GOWERS, supra note 152, § 4.32.
242. Id.
243. See id. ("I have never heard of a single one [band] deciding not to record a song
because it will fall out of copyright in 'only' fifty years.")
244. See 537 U.S. at 207 n.15.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 207-08 n.15 (majority opinion quoting Breyer, J., dissenting, at 255. Justice
Breyer's dissent relies, in part, upon the same economic rationale as does the Review's rejection
of the incentive-to-create argument.).
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Naturally, the Review could offer the rejoinder that it is unpersuasive
to pit the opinions of such major recording artists as were heard in the U.S.
legislative sessions cited in Eldred against that of a more parochial, rank-
and-file musician, such as the sole artist cited by the Review.248  This
argument would make sense only under reasoning which allows the limited
prospective fortunes of persons at the bottom rungs on the hierarchy of
stardom to dictate neighboring rights policy in the U.K.-the approach
which the Review had embraced in rejecting the fairness argument.
Nevertheless, the truth as to what might or might not motivate the creative
artist lies more in the content of what the (impeccably credentialed)
American artists who were cited in Eldred feel is the relationship between
rights protection and creative incentives. The Review's reliance upon the
cited brief of amicus curiae in Eldred seems analytically suspect, inasmuch
as the U.S. Supreme Court was satisfied that Congress had properly
exercised its authority in passing the CTEA. The British government,
should it (as the Review implicitly suggests249) opt to take into
consideration American legal precedent, would surely be more justified in
following the majority decision in Eldred than in setting a course based
upon evidence presented in an amicus brief which failed to influence the
majority in that case, in terms of the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of
Congressional decision-making.
The Review concludes its incentive-to-future-investment discussion
by pointing out that "the vast majority of works remain in copyright despite
not being economically viable for the rights holder. '250 Based, in part,
upon the reasoning that "the vast majority of income for sound
recordings ... [is] generated within the first few years of issue," the
Review concludes that "extension would only raise revenue for a small
minority of sound recordings, keeping the vast majority locked up.",
25'
Again, as it did in its rejection of the fairness argument, the Review uses
the hierarchy of success as a basis for concluding (rather paternalistically)
that an increased term of protection for performers and record companies
would be of negligible use to the recording industry252-- an industry which
in fact relies upon revenues from sound recordings and which is itself at the
forefront of the call for an extension to term.
248. GOWERS, supra note 152, § 4.32.
249. Id. § 4.31.
250. Id. § 4.33.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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4. Increase in the Number of Available Works
The Review summarizes this argument as follows: "[E]xtension of
term would increase [the] number of works available; copyright provides
incentives for rights holders to make works available to the public as it
gives rights holders a financial incentive to keep work commercially
available. 253  The Review does not elaborate upon how this argument
functions toward advocating an extension and, indeed, here it seems
possible that proponents for an extension to term have opened themselves
to refutation. The Review points to evidence of statistics that tend to show
that works in copyright, versus works in the public domain, are actually
less available, due to the requirement for those who would make use of
such works to negotiate licensing agreements with the rights holders.254 By
inference then, enduring works that are in the public domain are freely
used, and thus the utilitarian goals of the copyright and neighboring rights
systems are vindicated.
The flaw in the Review's reasoning lies in the fact that the grounding
of intellectual property rights rationales in utilitarian thought has
traditionally been true mainly in the U.K. and in the U.S., but not in the
255civil law countries of continental Europe. In the E.U., where the concept
of moral rights enjoys great vitality (and under whose law an extension to
term would have to be ratified), there ought to be less forceful objection to
the notion that a rights holder might retain control over his or her work for
a longer period, provided that period does not prove to be indefinite.256
Moreover, recent trends in copyright protection schema worldwide suggest
that the application of moral rights rationales to the protection of
performers' rights may currently be in a state of ascendancy.257
5. Improvement in the U.K. Trade Balance
According to the Review, the argument which posits that an extension
to term for performers' rights would assist in maintaining the U.K.'s
balance of trade relies upon two assumptions. 258  The first of these
253. Id. § 4.22.
254. See id. §§ 4.34-4.35.
255. See discussion supra Part III and accompanying sources cited (introducing a
comparative background in Anglo and European copyright law).
256. See discussion supra Part III and accompanying sources cited (discussing the WPPT's
significance because of its expanded emphasis on moral rights for performers).
257. See discussion supra Part III.B. 10 (noting developments in the U.S., and in worldwide
treaties such as the WPPT, which reflect growing recognition of performers' rights).
258. GOWERS, supra note 152, § 4.36.
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assumptions, according to the Review, is that an increase in term in the
U.K. is necessary to increase the term in other countries. 259 The second
assumption is that, due to the U.K.'s volume of exported music, an
extension to term would cause more revenue to accrue in the U.K. from
outside markets.26°
The Review answers the first assumption by asserting that "[because]
the term of protection depends on where a recording is played, not on
where it was produced ... [an] extension would only be beneficial to the
balance of trade if UK copyright owners were able to benefit from longer
terms in other countries.,, 261 The Review goes on to theorize that since the
largest markets for international repertoires (outside of Europe) are the U.S.
and Australia, which both already offer a substantially longer term of
protection, "changes in British law would not now affect the term granted
to British phonograms. 262 Here, the Review appears to lose track of the
central point: the extension to term would, under the Term Directive, need
to be a pan-European alteration in the law.263 The Review thus overlooks
the fact that benefits would flow to British performers under an extension
to term because their recordings would be forestalled from entering the
public domain both in the U.K. and in the E. U
2 64
The Review addresses the second assumption (which, it argues, may
be inferred from the trade balance argument for extension) by offering data
(based upon the CIPIL report) to show that the U.K. imports close to half
of the music sold in that country.265 For this reason, according to the
Review, forty-three percent of the additional revenue from an extension to
term would go outside the U.K. to the countries of origin for that share of
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. § 4.37.
262. Id.
263. See Council Directive 93/98, art. 3.1, 1993 O.J. (L290) 9 (EEC) (The rights of
performers shall expire 50 years after the date of the performance. However, if a fixation of the
performance is lawfully published or lawfully communicated to the public within this period, the
rights shall expire 50 years from the date of the first such publication or the first such
communication to the public, whichever is the earlier); see also E-mail from Dr. Johanna Gibson,
Reader in Intellectual Property Law, Queen Mary Intellectual Property Research Institute, Centre
for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London, to the author (Nov. 5, 2006,
7:52 AM EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gibson E-mail Nov. 5, 2006] (The U.K., as a
member of the [European] Community, must ensure that its law is in compliance with the [Term]
Directive. This is achieved by 'implementing' a Directive into national law.... [T]he term of
protection that must be accorded to related rights according to Community law is set out in
Article 3 of the Term Directive).
264. Anderson Interview, supra note 9.
265. GOWERS, supra note 152, § 4.38.
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the U.K. market.266 Thus, the CIPIL report concludes that "increasing
copyright term at home from 50 to 70 or 95 years is likely to have a
disproportionate, negative effect on the balance of trade. 267 On the other
hand, the Review suggests that, in the absence of an extension, "[b]ecause
the cost of [music] licenses reflects the royalties payable on the copyrights,
as those copyrights expire, so the cost of the licenses will fall.
268
Such reasoning is obviously grounded in a deeper concern for the
market effects of particular term-of-protection schema than for the rights
holders themselves, which reflects both utilitarian and contemporary
neoclassical economics copyright theory. 269  This economics-driven
approach may be a fair rebuttal to the term extension argument that
proceeded from a balance-of-trade perspective. But interestingly,
neoclassical economic copyright theory generally favors strong protection
for rights holders, and holds the concepts of fair use and public domain to
be inefficient. 270 Therefore, the Review's application of the theory, and its
placement of national economic interests above those of the performers
themselves, does a disservice to the moral rights philosophy which (in
addition to informing intellectual property law in the E.U. apart from Great
Britain) is at the true heart of performers' advocacy of an extension to
term.27'
The Review concludes this portion of its examination of intellectual
property law in the U.K. by formally recommending that "[t]he European
Commission should retain the length of protection on sound recordings and
performers' rights at [fifty] years. ' '27 : The Review's summary of its
findings, in this respect, is as follows:
In conclusion, the Review finds the arguments in favour [sic] of
term extension unconvincing. The evidence suggests that
extending the term of protection for sound recordings or
performers' rights prospectively would not increase the
incentives to invest, would not increase the number of works
created or made available, and would negatively impact upon
consumers and industry. Furthermore, by increasing the period
266. Id. § 4.38.
267. Id.
268. Id. § 4.39.
269. See, e.g., JOYCE., supra note 13, at 59-60 (describing contemporary economic rhetoric
in copyright law as being "premised on faith in the power of the free market to allocate scarce
resources").
270. See id. at 60.
271. See, e.g., Anderson Interview, supra note 9.
272. GOWERS, supra note 152, at Recommendation 3.
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of protection, future creators would have to wait an additional
length of time to build upon past works to create new products
and those wishing to revive protected but forgotten material
would be unable to do so for a longer period of time. The CIPIL
report indicates that the overall impact of term extension on
welfare would be a net loss in present value terms of 7.8 percent
of current revenue, approximately £ 155 million.273
The Review then proceeds to address a proposal that the term of
protection in sound recordings be extended retroactively. 274 This proposal
deals with the issue that is of greatest concern to performers who face the
impending expiration of protection, as their work progressively enters the
public domain over the coming years.275 The Review does not dwell for
long upon this issue. As Ian Anderson (among others) has argued, and as
the Review acknowledges, "[t]he principal argument [for an] increase [in]
sound term retrospectively is that many recordings from the 1950s are
beginning to fall out of copyright... [which] will lead to a loss of revenue,
therefore impacting on the incentives to invest in newer artists. '2 76 The
Review formally recommends that "[p]olicy makers should adopt the
principle that the term and scope of protection for IP rights should not be
altered retrospectively., 277 The Review arrived at this recommendation by
marshalling an argument that is essentially a reiteration of the rejection of
the incentive-to-future-investment argument, and by relying upon market-
analysis data from CIPIL and from PWC.2 78 In addition to its reliance upon
the CIPIL data, the Review again bases its conclusion, with respect to this
issue, upon its reasoning that:
[t]he additional revenue for producers is likely to come from the
most popular recordings, which will have a correspondingly
high cultural value. Given that a low number of sound
recordings or performances retain any commercial value beyond
[fifty] years, extending term to all these would lock up the
majority of recordings that are not generating income, rendering
them unavailable for consumers and future creators.279
Thus, in elevating the concerns of the theoretical future user of older
recordings above those of the rights-holder, the Review returns to a classic
273. Id. § 4.40.
274. Id. §§ 4.41-4.47.
275. Anderson Interview, supra note 9.
276. GOWERS, supra note 152, § 4.43; see also Anderson Interview, supra note 9.
277. GOWERS, supra note 152, at Recommendation 4.
278. Id.
279. Id. § 4.47.
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utilitarian argument. What the Review does not appear to anticipate is the
potential shift in the importance of older recordings in the coming years.
Fifty years ago, the world had yet to see the explosion of British recorded
popular music which would inexorably gather momentum over the next
twenty years. Thus, the recordings which are now due to begin falling into
the public domain might well be of increasingly dominant cultural value,
effectively rendering the Review's logic (at best) moot, and (at worst)
anachronistic. In other words, whereas it may be true that the vast bulk of
older recordings were of little or no cultural value beyond their fifty-year
term, the recordings from the golden age of rock & roll will be of enormous
cultural value. Such is the central thesis underlying Ian Anderson's
position.28°
Even supposing that the status quo remained unchanged regarding the
cultural value of older recordings, if the Review's analysis is correct (i.e., if
the majority of older recordings are of little value, from a revenue-
gathering perspective), what then is the importance of handing those
recordings over to a hypothetical public domain beneficiary? Such
beneficiaries would have even less use for these recordings than the current
rights holders; therefore, why favor them?
The Gowers Review of Intellectual Property will, almost
undoubtedly, be the defining policy-setting instrument, insofar as the
British government is concerned, with potential revisions to pan-European
281 bsschemes regarding performers' rights protections. If, based upon the
Review's recommendations, the British government does not advocate an
extension to term, then the E.U. will need to be influenced more directly by
performers and recording industry representatives, who are most concerned
about the increasing tempo of impending copyright expiration as the public
domain overtakes the recordings of the early years of rock & roll. It
remains to be seen whether the E.U. is susceptible to being persuaded to
rely more upon a philosophical rationale in favor of supporting existing-
rights holders, or whether economic analysis might ultimately carry the day
despite the fact that rights protections on the Continent have traditionally
been more heavily influenced by the natural rights and personality rights
points of view whose origins lie with Locke and Hegel.282
280. See Anderson Interview, supra note 9; Anderson, supra note 2.
281. See, generally, Gibson E-mail Jan. 31, 2007, supra note 192 (discussing the immediate
effects of the release of the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property).
282. See, e.g., JOYCE, ET AL., supra note 13, at 54-57; see also text supra, Section III and
cited authorities (introducing a comparative background in Anglo and European copyright law).
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V. A LEGAL/PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS
There are many unanswered questions involving legal philosophy that
might be raised along with the consideration of whether to extend
performers' rights protections in the E.U. One of these questions centers
on the extent to which countries that purport to embrace the natural rights
view regarding copyright protection are willing to bring the central theses
of that philosophy of law to the table when called upon to support a change
in the law. In the current debate-under which the principal beneficiaries
of such a change would be primarily British, as opposed to, for example,
French or Italian-this commitment to a natural rights philosophy will be
put to the acid-test. Additionally-and conversely-one might question
the extent to which the legal reasoning of the eighteenth century (as
reflected in Great Britain's Statute of Anne 83 and, later, in the United
States Constitution 284) still provides any compelling foundation for
limitations upon copyright protection. For better or worse, such limitations
are, to this day, reflected both in U.S. and U.K. law under a utilitarian
rationale. Indeed, even within the U.S.-which, nominally, espouses a
utilitarian-based copyright system-there is evidence of a shift in
legislative thinking toward the embrace of a moral rights rationale in
28copyright protection. 85 This shift has manifested itself in, for example, the
grant of a right of attribution for visual artists under the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990.286
With respect to E.U. law, it is questionable whether a protection
regime that is based upon a rationale that traditionally views performers as
being of subsidiary importance to authors is consistent with the
fundamental goals which underlie the unification of European states into
the E.U. The dubious nature of an adherence to such a protection regime is
especially salient where, as here, that regime allows a negative impact to
fall disproportionately upon a single Member State-i.e., Great Britain.
283. See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.) (creating statutory, time-limited
copyright protection, under the utilitarian rationale, and supplanting the common law, which had
offered a theoretically perpetual right of protection, based upon a natural rights rationale).
284. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
285. See 17 U.S.C. 106A (2006).
286. See generally Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosis of
"Authorship", 41 DUKE L.J. 455, 498-99 (1991) (discussing the application of the concept of
moral rights in the United States); text supra Part III.A (concluding with a discussion of a general
trend toward a natural law-based formulation of copyright in the U.S.); JOYCE, ET AL., supra note
13, at 57 (noting that natural law (as opposed to utilitarian) theories enjoy vitality in the discourse
of British and American copyright law, and "throughout the history of Anglo-American
copyright... have been successfully deployed to explain or to justify virtually every extension of
the scope or intensity of copyright protection").
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The debate over a potential extension of neighboring rights will place
new, practical emphasis upon what might ordinarily be the province of
legal and economic theorists. The forces of economics might well exert an
influence upon the determination as to the nature of intellectual property
rights in a way that renders such theories as natural rights functionally
moot.287 If that is the case, what might this say about the manner in which
intellectual property is conceived in the E.U.? Is it possible that there is an
essential illogic underlying the law, such that when, for example, French,
Italian, or Dutch intellectual property rights are at issue, the law provides
one type of protection based upon one type of theory (e.g., droit moral),
while, at the same time, that theory is not willingly extended to a country
such as Great Britain? This potential illogic comes into sharp relief
assuming that Great Britain might, in fact, see the advantage of moving
away from the utilitarian arguments for limitations on copyright protection,
and toward the natural rights conception which underscores the rationale
adhered to by the majority of E.U. states (and which had provided the
original basis for copyright protection under the British common law).
If, upon close inspection, it is revealed that such an inconsistency of
logic is actually to be unearthed in copyright law within the E.U., then it is
clear that economic considerations are, in fact, solely responsible for
driving the policy of the E.U. Consequently, concepts such as droit moral
would, for all practical purposes, be relegated to the status of quaint, legal
anachronisms, like curios preserved in a glass case in a museum. Indeed,
advocates of the utilitarian model would argue that the moral rights
philosophy, which arises under the natural rights rationale, represents a
hindrance upon economic freedom. As Peter Jaszi says "moral
rights ... are not in the marketplace; they are inalienable .... Such a legal
application of 'authorship' can only impede the free commerce in
intellectual and artistic productions that Anglo-American copyright
traditionally has fostered. In effect, moral rights represent a charter for
private censorship. 288
Jaszi's assertion is in line with the utilitarian suspicion that a natural
rights approach to copyright eliminates the creation of a public domain and
thus restricts the economic utility of created works. This view is shown to
be simplistic however, when seen in light of competing arguments which
illustrate that, rather than eliminating the public domain, the natural rights
philosophy actually creates and encourages a strong public domain. 289 One
287. See, e.g., GOWERS, supra note 152, §§ 4.20-4.47.
288. Jaszi, supra note 286, at 497.
289. See, e.g., Yen, supra note 39, at 552-57 (discussing the manner in which inherent
limitations upon a right of property and possession serve to prevent natural law from eliminating
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such argument is premised upon the inherent limitations that exist with
respect to that which may be considered susceptible of possession, and that
which may not be possessed: "[t]hese limits both explain and justify
limiting the expansion of copyright law., 290 An additional argument rests
upon the recognition that, in the modem age, authorship itself can never be
truly afforded the status of an absolutely sole endeavor: "[a]uthorship
is ... not the creation of works which spring like Athena from the head of
Zeus, but the conscious and unconscious intake, digestion and
transformation of input gained from the author's experience within a
broader society. 291 Under this view, the underlying influences from which
a work is derived cannot become the proprietary possession of the author,
and thus, this influencing material must be part of the public domain.292 A
theoretically unlimited right of possession in authored works must
necessarily be premised upon the notion that the author acts in a cultural
and artistic vacuum. Since this is literally not possible, authors' rights
must, even under a natural law justification, be susceptible of some degree
of limitation. As Alfred C. Yen says:
Under complete authors' rights, an author would receive
compensation from any successor who borrowed from the
author's work. However, our author would also owe huge debts
to her predecessors for any material she might have borrowed
from them.... [But] if people really did have complete property
rights in their intellectual products[,] .... a hypothetical writer
would have no right to use many literary techniques or language
itself. If our author were a composer, other individuals would
already claim exclusive rights to basic musical forms and styles
such as the sonata form, impressionism, and the like. A painter
would surely confront similar problems when drawing
inspiration from the works of others. Indeed, if property rights
in all products of the mind really were complete, practically all
of mankind's intellectual heritage would be private property.
Future authors would simply have little, if any, chance of
achieving any sort of viable art. If nothing else, the cost of
compensating all sources for material borrowed would bankrupt
any author. The problems of "reinventing the wheel" would be
simply overwhelming.
293
the public domain).
290. Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
291. Id. at 554.
292. Id. at 557.
293. Id. at 556.
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Thus, even a natural law rationale for the protection of various forms
of copyrights must recognize that some degree of limitation is necessary.
Therefore, the voices that warn of economic waste as a byproduct of a
theoretically non-existent public domain speak with an excessively strident
tone.
It is true that the French concept of droit moral (which informs the
thinking underlying most copyright legislation in the countries of the E.U.)
is closely linked with the concept of droit d'auteur-the notion that the
author of a work should possess an economic interest in that work,
theoretically (though, for the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraph,
not practically), in perpetuity.294 Droit d'auteur-the philosophy under
which economic rights are conceived in France, and which is mirrored in
other countries of the European Union-is, like the concept of droit moral,
derived from the natural rights approach to copyright protection.2 95 There
are those who would argue that the very notion of droit d'auteur creates a
natural reluctance to confer anything more than a very limited scope of
protections to derivative works of an author, even in countries that apply a
droit moral approach to the overall law of copyright, based upon natural
rights.296 Indeed, under the utilitarian model of the U.K., such is the very
rationale which gives rise to neighboring rights protections. 297 The right is
said to be "neighboring" because it is derivative of the work in support of
which it arises.2 98
Neighboring rights belong to performers and distributors of recorded
music and are more severely limited 299 than are the rights of authors,
composers, and the like.300  For example, even the utilitarian model
differentiates between the underlying musical composition of a recording
artist and the performance of a musician for hire in the recording of that
composition, as well as the distribution and marketing of that recording.
The reluctance of countries embracing a natural rights model to grant
performers' rights could possibly be seen as tacit acknowledgement of the
294. See generally ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 13.
295. See generally LEAFFER, supra note 10, at 17-19 (discussing the natural law
justification for copyright protection, as an alternative to the utilitarian rationale); see also JOYCE,
ET AL., supra note 13, at 548; see also ADENEY, supra note 27, at 168-72 (nature of droit moral).
296. See, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 13.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. Neighboring rights are limited in the U.K. under the Copyright, Designs, and Patents
Act of 1988 and, in the E.U., under the Term Directive and TRIPs.
300. See generally ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 13-43 (providing a detailed historical
overview of copyright and of neighboring rights); see also text supra Part III.B (discussing the
development of the law).
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Anglo attitude toward protecting economic interests.
Nevertheless, one would imagine that the generally broader scope of
authors' rights conferred in Continental Europe under the natural rights
model ought, by extension, to apply to the so-called "related rights" of
performers, as reflected in an expansion of the duration of such protection.
Indeed, advocates for change in the U.K. are not asking for unlimited or
perpetual protection of performers' rights.301 Instead, the U.K. advocates
are merely asking for extending the term of performers' rights protections
so as not to leave performers in the position of witnessing the fruits of their
labor becoming part of the public domain within their lifetimes.30 2 To
those who view such an extension of term as an economic threat, it should
be pointed out that extending the duration of performers' rights protections
would be of negligible deleterious effect. This is particularly so in light of
the fact that the general scope of such protections would remain
circumscribed, as between the rights of performers and those of authors.
As a practical matter, even if the E.U. extends the term of performers'
rights protections, what would be covered under such an extension? Would
the extension apply prospectively 3°3 or would it be retroactive? This is not
an unfamiliar question, in the experience of those who have tracked
developments in copyright law with respect to authors' rights. As Dr.
Johanna Gibson wrote when referring to a recent extension to the term of
authors' rights:
[T]he issue arises whether the extension should apply to existing
copyright works or only works created after the law comes into
effect. So, for example, if a work was created in 1990 (when the
U.K. term was life of the author plus 50 years) then, when term
was extended in 1995, should there have been an extension of
protection for that work still in copyright? In other words,
should that work now be protected for the new term of life of the
author plus 70 years? In general, the new term of protection is
applied to all existing works, so that means that all works
currently protected would have an extended term matching the
new term of protection. This is a policy decision rather than a
legal matter.304
Such policy is borne out in the United States, as Justice Ginsburg
301. See discussion supra Part III.B.7-9.
302. See, e.g., Anderson Interview, supra note 9.
303. In which case, the very artists whose work is at peril and whose calls for reform would
provide the basis for an extension, would fail to benefit.
304. Gibson E-mail Nov. 5, 2006, supra note 263.
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illustrated in Eldred v. Ashcroft:
Congress' consistent historical practice of applying newly
enacted copyright terms to future and existing copyrights
reflects a judgment stated concisely by Representative
Huntington at the time of the 1831 [Copyright] Act: "Justice,
policy, and equity alike forbid" that an "author who had sold his
[work] a week ago, be placed in a worse situation than the
author who should sell his work the day after the passing of [the]
act.
," 3
05
VI. CONCLUSION
There are compelling arguments for extending neighboring rights
protections under E.U. law. At their core, these arguments are founded
more upon a philosophical attitude toward the proper scope of performers'
rights than upon a series of cold, economic formulations. Nevertheless, as
Ian Anderson has argued, there are very sound economic incentives
underlying the call for an extension to the term of performers' rights. 30 6 It
is a matter of historical irony that economic arguments can now be
marshaled in favor of an extended term protection, when one considers the
fact that the British utilitarian model of statutory, time-limited copyright
protection had originally proceeded under an economics-driven theory. It
is a matter of even greater historical irony that opposition to the notion of
performers' rights protections exceeding fifty years from the date of origin
might come not primarily from Great Britain, but rather, from continental
Europe. In continental Europe, the natural rights philosophy had
traditionally stood in opposition to the British scheme of statutory
copyright protection and was more consistent with the original common
law scheme.
Unfortunately, legislation in an international organization such as the
E.U. necessarily entails more than a consideration of the arguments that
may be advanced in support of proponents who share a direct, vested
interest in the outcome of that legislation-in this case British recording
artists and record companies. Arguing for an extension of neighboring
rights protections for performers of British nationality inevitably carries the
305. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003) (emphasis added) (citing 7 Cong. Deb.
424 (1831); accord Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension, 18
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 694 (2000) ("[Slince 1790, it has indeed been Congress' policy
that the author of yesterday's work should not get a lesser reward than the author of tomorrow's
work just because Congress passed a statute lengthening the term today.")).
306. See Anderson Interview, supra note 9; Anderson, supra note 2.
2007]
428 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:383
potential to set the U.K. on a collision course with the E.U., due to the
disparity of interests between those entities.
In turning to the E.U. for support, British holders of neighboring
rights protections are, in essence, asking for something without an
immediately discernible quid-pro-quo. What is true without being
immediately discernible, however, is the fact that, while it is true that Great
Britain would be asking the E.U. to give something, the fact is that Great
Britain has already given something. What Great Britain has done has
been to provide the world with a rich heritage of recorded music-a
heritage that has provided not only economic value to the Continental
countries of the E.U., but also deep cultural value.
At the time when performing musical groups such as the Beatles and
the Rolling Stones were in their ascendancy, the so-called "Establishment"
viewed such groups as, at best, an annoyance and, at worst, a dangerously
subversive chorus of voices threatening to upend society. Time has altered
that viewpoint. The Rolling Stones have now played the halftime show at
the Super Bowl, on live television, before one of the largest pan-American
audiences ever.307 Indeed, the Rolling Stones' lead singer, Mick Jagger,
has been knighted by the Queen of England.30 8 Rock star Bono, of the Irish
group, U-2, is a recognized force in international diplomacy. 30 9 Even as
much as twenty years ago, another Irish rock star-punk singer Bob
Geldoff--organized Live Aid.3'0  Thirty-six years ago, George Harrison
organized the Concert for Bangladesh.31 1  The respectability of these
individuals speaks to the correction in perception that must necessarily
accompany any reasoned assessment of the power and value of popular
music. After Bill Haley first "rocked around the clock, ' 312 after Elvis
shocked viewers with his hip-gyrating antics in service to the nascent
demon rock & roll,313 the torch was rapidly passed to residents of
307. The Rolling Stones to Perform During Sprint Super Bowl XL Halftime Show on ABC,
Nov. 29, 2005, http://www.superbowl.com/features/entertainment/rollingstones.
308. Jagger Knighthood: Richards Rages, CNN.cOM, Dec. 4, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/SHOWBIZ/Music/12/04/agger.richards.reut/.
309. Nancy Gibbs, The Good Samaritans, TIME, Dec. 26, 2005, at 44, available at
http://www.time.com/time/manazine/article/0,9171,11422 78,00.html.
310. Live Aid: The Show that Rocked the World, BBC NEWS, Apr. 5, 2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/uk-news/702700.stm. (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
311. Rachel Bonham Carter, George Harrison Honoured on 35th Anniversary of "Concert
for Bangledesh," UNICEF BANGLADESH NEWSLINE, Aug. 1, 2006,
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/bangladesh_35176.html.
312. Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inductee List: Bill Haley,
http://www.rockhall.com/hof/inductee.asp?id=l 16 (last visited Mar. 14, 2007).
313. Paul McNamee, Access All Areas... Polaroid Memories of Elvis, BELFAST
TELEGRAPH, June 13, 2006, available at
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Liverpool, and other British towns such as Dorchester, London,
Manchester and, in the case of Ian Anderson and Jethro Tull, Luton. The
world would not be the place it is now were it not for the likes of the
Beatles and the Rolling Stones, along with all of their progeny-the so
called "British Invasion."
The U.K. has thus contributed mightily to the cultural state of the
world today in the form of the music of a generation-which led, in turn, to
the music of the next two generations. Certainly it is possible to advance
arguments against extending performers' rights-arguments which would
rest entirely upon economic considerations. But the nature of artistic
rights, especially in the countries of Continental Europe, has never been
founded upon purely economic considerations. Even in the increasingly
economics-driven marketplace, it is possible that the utilitarian ideal that
once informed protection of copyright by statute in the U.K. may well have
outlived its usefulness. The natural rights rationale, and, specifically the
Hegelian personal rights rationale,314 may now be called to center stage
under a reasonable analysis of the state of entertainment in the modem age.
Thus, what is asked of the E.U. is a reaffirmation of the natural rights
philosophy that resulted in the droit moral basis upon which copyright is
conceived, in the countries of Continental Europe.
At the very least, one might argue that the term of performers' rights
protections, as it now stands, could benefit from revision based upon
developments in terms of society, economic markets, and technology.
Again, turning to the U.S. for policy justifications, as Justice Ginsburg
pointed out (in her opinion in Eldred v. Ashcroft), in passing the Copyright
Term Extension Act:
[m]embers of Congress expressed the view that, as a result of
increases in human longevity and in parents' average age when
their children are born, the pre-CTEA term did not adequately
secure 'the right to profit from licensing one's work during
one's lifetime and to take pride and comfort in knowing that
one's children-and perhaps their children-might also benefit
from one's posthumous popularity.'
31 5
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/imported/article982582.ece.
314. The Hegelian personal rights rationale is that a person's right to control and profit from
their performance inheres in the fact that that performance is an expression of, and is inseparable
from, that person's personality.
315. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 n.14 (2002) (citing 141 CONG. REc. 6553 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Feinstein); also citing 144 CONG. REC. S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Among the main developments [compelling reconsideration of the
1976 Act's term] is the effect of demographic trends, such as increasing longevity and the trend
toward rearing children later in life, on the effectiveness of the life-plus-50 term to provide
2007]
430 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:383
The Gowers Review has recommended against the extension of the
term of performers' rights in Great Britain.31 6 The British government
accepted the recommendations of the Review upon submission.317
Nevertheless, the debate will surely continue, although it will do so in the
countries of Continental Europe rather than in the very homeland of the
cultural lode that is sought to be protected.318
It remains to be seen what voices will be brought to bear in the U.K.
in an effort to secure the support of Western Europe to the cause of
extended neighboring rights protection for those whose works stand to fall
into the public domain within their own lifetimes. Should those voices not
prevail, the rich cultural heritage that has been created by the artists of
Great Britain could fall by the wayside of economic progress, as a result of
the evaporation of record companies' economic incentives to continue
marketing the product of those artists' work. But the costs-not only in
terms of the future, but also in terms of the respect that is owed to a past
generation of artists and the wealth of material they have created-may
well outweigh the present-moment benefits. When all is said and done,
perhaps the best expression, in reaction to the prospect of the United
Kingdom's reluctance to support an extension of the term of performers'
rights protections, is also that which is most simply stated: as Ian
Anderson said, in response to early indications as to the results of the
Gowers Review, "[i]t's a sad day if an industry that has contributed so
much culturally and commercially can be treated so dismissively!
' 31 9
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